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The Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington
and United States v. Booker have, at least on the surface,
profoundly altered sentencing in the United States. In just
fifty-seven pages, the Blakely Court potentially invalidated
the presumptive guidelines or determinate sentencing
laws used in thirteen states, which collectively incarcerate
over a quarter of all the inmates in the country.' Though
supreme courts in these states continue to wrestle with
Blakely's implications, most have held their systems
unconstitutional, and these states likely will have to
amend their guidelines.2
One possible remedy that has started to receive atten-
tion is to make now-impermissibly binding guidelines
voluntary. But such guidelines are often perceived as hav-
ing little effect. Michael Tonry, for example, argued in
1996 that with the possible exception of those used by
Delaware, voluntary guidelines had had no perceptible
impact on judicial behavior) And following Booker, U.S.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales warned that making
the federal guidelines voluntary would likely lead to
greater sentencing disparity.4
The relative efficacy of presumptive guidelines over
voluntary, however, appears to have never been subjected
to rigorous empirical testing.5 I recently sought to address
this critical gap in the sentencing literature by testing the
hypothesis that voluntary guidelines can influence judicial
behavior as effectively as presumptive. 6
In general, my findings suggest that while voluntary
guidelines are not as effective in curbing disparity as pre-
sumptive guidelines, they are nonetheless effective. The
variation in sentence lengths imposed on violent offenders,
for example, appears to drop by io to 24 percent under vol-
untary guidelines, compared to a drop of 6 to 49 percent
under presumptive. For the sentences imposed on those
convicted of property crimes, voluntary guidelines seem to
reduce variation by as much as 17 percent, and presump-
tive guidelines by as little as 6 percent and by as much as
45 percent. And for drug offenders, voluntary guideline
adoption is correlated with declines in variation of 12 to 18
percent, and that of presumptive guidelines with declines
of 17 to 54 percent.
Similarly, both voluntary and presumptive guidelines
appear to reduce the extent to which race and sex explain
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sentence lengths. Again presumptive guidelines seem gen-
erally to outperform voluntary, but voluntary guidelines still
have salutary effects. For some crimes, for example, volun-
tary guidelines are at least half as effective as presumptive
guidelines (and in at least one instance three-fourths so). In
general, however, voluntary guidelines appear to affect the
use of impermissible factors less than variation.
Blakely's impact thus may not be that pronounced:
states may be able to retain many of the benefits of pre-
sumptive guidelines simply by making them voluntary.
This article explores these results in more depth. Section I
discusses the basic empirical model and its general find-
ings.7 Of course, no empirical project is without its
compromises and limits, and Section II considers several
of these. Finally, Section III lays out some important open
questions still requiring examination, especially that of
why judges actually follow voluntary guidelines.
I. The Relative Efficacy of Voluntary Guidelines
In order to empirically test whether voluntary guidelines
can viably replace presumptive, I need to first define a
metric of "success." Admittedly, states adopt sentencing
guidelines, both voluntary and presumptive, to accom-
plish numerous (and sometimes conflicting) goals. Many
states, for example, hope that their guidelines will restrain
incarceration growth, but a few (perhaps most famously
the federal government, but also Pennsylvania and possi-
bly Michigan) seek to restrain lenient judges instead. 8
However, almost all-if not all-adopting states hope
their guidelines will accomplish at least two goals. First,
they want their guidelines to reduce sentencing dispari-
ties; they want to ensure that similar offenders are
sentenced similarly. And second, they want judges to pay
less attention to the race and sex of the defendant. Given
their universality, I focus on these goals, testing two
hypotheses: that (i) voluntary guidelines reduce variation
in sentence length as well as presumptive, and (2) volun-
tary guidelines reduce judicial attention to the race and sex
of the defendant as well as presumptive.
A. The Data and the Model
To test these hypotheses, I used data from the National
Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP). Started in 1983,
the NCRP is a voluntary reporting program in which par-
ticipating states annually provide detailed information on
each prisoner admitted to their prisons. These data
include demographic details such as the race and sex of
the inmate, as well as data on the crimes for which the
prisoner was convicted and the sentences received for
them. The NCRP is not a perfect data set-most
critically, as discussed in more depth below, it does not
include information on the prior criminal history of the
prisoner-but it is one of the few on sentencing that per-
mits cross-state comparisons. 9
I looked at the NCRP between the years I989 and
2ooo, during which time fourteen states consistently sub-
mitted data. During these years, two of the fourteen
adopted voluntary guidelines (Missouri in 1997 and Vir-
ginia in 19950), and two adopted presumptive (Michigan
in 199911 and Ohio in 1996). One of these states used vol-
untary guidelines throughout the whole period (Maryland),
two used presumptive throughout (Tennessee"2 and Wash-
ington), and one used a determinate sentencing law
(California). The remaining six did not adopt or use guide-
lines throughout the sample period (Alabama, Illinois,3
Kentucky, Oklahoma, Nevada, and South Carolina).
To measure the effect of guideline adoption on sen-
tence variation, I developed an individual-level measure of
variation I call the "mean difference": it calculates the
extent to which the sentence imposed on a prisoner dif-
fered from his crime's average sentence in his state in the
year in which he was sentenced. In other words, if the
average sentence imposed on arsonists in Virginia in 1994
was io years, then a defendant who received a 7-year sen-
tence would have a "mean difference" score of 3, that is, of
10 - 7; this measure is symmetric, so an arsonist sen-
tenced in Virginia in 1994 to 13 years would also have a
mean difference score of 3 (not -3). I then regressed this
score on the race and sex of the defendant and on whether
the sentencing state had voluntary or presumptive guide-
lines in that year. 4 I ran three separate regressions, one
each for violent, property, and drug crimes; due to prob-
lems in the drug data, the results for those crimes are
much less reliable than those for the other two. 5
The model examining guideline adoption's effect on
the use of the defendant's race and sex is somewhat more
complex. For this, I regressed the single longest sentence
imposed not only on variables indicating whether the state
employed guidelines in that year, but also on variables that
examined how the adoption of guidelines changed the
importance of race and sex.'
6
The biggest empirical problem I faced was endogene-
ity. Ohio, for example, did not adopt its guidelines
randomly in 1996: something induced the state to act
then. But what if that "something" was correlated with,
say, sentence variation? Perhaps Ohio adopted guidelines
because variation was getting worse, or perhaps it adopted
guidelines during a period of declining variation. If, as
appears to be the case, variation declined in many states
prior to adoption, then my regressions may overstate the
apparently beneficial effects of adoption. To control for
this, I included time trends for each state; with these, the
regressions measure the change in variation (or in the use
of race or sex) net of any preexisting trend. The tables
below include the results for two types of corrections,
whose differences are not important for the purposes of
this Article; since there is no a priori way to prefer one
over the other, I provide the results for both types of cor-
rections as well as for the uncorrected results.7
B. The Effect of Guideline Adoption
With that basic setup, we can turn to the specific results.
1. The Effect of Guidelines on Variation. Table I pro-
vides the findings for how well voluntary and presumptive
guidelines reduce variation in sentencing. 5
In words, the adoption of voluntary guidelines is corre-
lated with a io.282-month decline in mean difference for
violent crimes in the regression that does not correct for
endogeneity; in that with the linear corrections for endo-
geneity, with a 7.435-month decline; and so on. Two
patterns emerge in Table i. First, for most specifications
voluntary and presumptive guidelines have similar effects,
especially for violent and property crimes. Second, correct-
ing for endogeneity reduces the absolute effects of both
types of guidelines, but it raises the relative effect of volun-
tary guidelines.9 In some cases, voluntary guidelines
actually appear more effective in absolute terms than pre-
sumptive.
Voluntary guidelines thus seem capable of reducing
variation in sentencing, in some cases almost as well, if
not as well, as presumptive guidelines. It is true that in
some specifications voluntary guidelines appear to have
Table 1. The Effect of Guideline Adoption on the Mean Difference in Sentence Length
(Absolute Effect)
I: Uncorrected Results II: Correction i III: Correction 2
Violent crimes Voluntary GL -1O.282*** -7.435* -6.622
Presumptive GL -13.271*** -5.682** -3.341**
Property crimes Voluntary GL -3.611 -i.8io -1.4o8
Presumptive GL -8.918** -1.487 -1.346
Drug crimes Voluntary GL -5.632*** -2.631 -3.574***
Presumptive GL -14.o25*** -9.898*** -5.7o6
Note: Coefficients marked with *** are significant at the 99 percent level; with **, at the 95 percent level; with *, at the 90 percent
level. The coefficients are in months.
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little effect, but generally neither do presumptive guide-
lines in the same specifications. To the extent that policy
makers want to replicate the world that exists with pre-
sumptive guidelines, the results in Table i suggest that
voluntary guidelines may be viable options.
2. The Effect of Guidelines on the Use of Impermissible
Factors. I also examined whether voluntary and pre-
sumptive guidelines reduce judicial reliance on two
"impermissible" sentencing factors: race and sex. The
results here are less reliable than those in the previous
section, due to limitations in the data. The NCRP does not
provide any information on a defendant's prior criminal
history, and extensive evidence indicates that criminal his-
tory is correlated with race.20 Thus even a race-neutral
judge will likely sentence black defendants to longer terms
on average. Moreover, there is no effective way to proxy for
criminal history, and without such a proxy the resulting
coefficients are likely biased, though there is no way to
predict the bias's direction. A similar problem exists with
regard to sex.
However, this is not as big a problem as it might ini-
tially appear. The focus here is not on the role per se of race
and sex at sentencing, but rather on how that role changes
with guideline adoption, and on how that change varies
between states using voluntary and presumptive guide-
lines. As long as prior criminal history's importance does
not change over time, its omission does not bias the meas-
ure of adoption's importance within a state, and it may not
complicate comparisons across states.22 Of course, the
assumption that the history's importance is constant is
surely too strong-guidelines often explicitly incorporate
prior criminal history as a key factor in the sentencing
process, which should alter its significance. And given the
magnitudes of the effects discussed here, it appears that
these tests overstate the true impact of adopting guide-
lines (i.e., it is unlikely that guidelines reduce the use of
race or sex to the extent suggested below). It is not possi-
ble, though, to make predictions about the effect of the
biases on the relative efficacy of voluntary and presump-
tive guidelines. These results, then, provide only a first cut
at measuring the importance of presumptiveness. They
are not definitive, and I hope to develop more reliable tests
in the future using state-gathered data.
With that important caveat, Table 2 provides the basic
findings. The first cell of Column I implies that volun-
tary guidelines reduce the importance of race at
sentencing for violent crimes by 72 percent. In other
words, if prior to guideline adoption blacks received sen-
tences io months longer than whites did (controlling for
all other possible explanations of sentence length), then
after adoption their sentences are only 2.8 months
longer. A value over ioo percent means the direction of
the "bias" reverses: -io6 percent in the second cell of
Column I suggests that the adoption of presumptive
guidelines causes black sentences, which prior to adop-
tion were longer than white sentences, to become 6
percent shorter.
Except for violent crimes, the results for race are con-
sistently statistically insignificant and numerically small,
both for the underlying role of race and for the effect of
adopting either type of guideline. For violent crimes, pre-
sumptive guidelines have a stronger effect than
voluntary, both numerically and statistically. Presumptive
guidelines also tend to have stronger effects, both numer-
ically and statistically, on the use of sex across all three
classes of crimes. While the results for presumptive
guidelines are significant at at least the 90 percent level
(and at the 95 percent level in all but two instances), those
for voluntary guidelines are rarely significant at even the
85 percent or 8o percent level. Thus while voluntary
guidelines may reduce the role of race or sex at sentenc-
ing, the reliability of these results is less than that for
presumptive.
But putting aside the (important) issue of statistical
significance, these results point to the same conclusions
seen in the variation regressions, at least for violent
crimes. While presumptive guidelines are more effective
than voluntary, the latter still often manage to contribute.
For property and drug crimes, however, the effects are
weaker (and in two specifications appear to make the
problem worse).
Table 2. The Effect of Guideline Adoption on the Use of Race and Sex at Sentencing
I: Uncorrected Results II: Correction i III: Correction 2
Violent crimes Race Voluntary GL -72% -37% -34%
Presumptive GL -lo6% -136% -1i2%
Sex Voluntary GL -11% -36% -14%
Presumptive GL -64% -6o% -65%
Property crimes Race Voluntary GL Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant
Presumptive GL Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant
Sex Voluntary GL -97% +54% -16%
Presumptive GL -73% -126% -io6%
Drug crimes Race Voluntary GL Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant
Presumptive GL Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant
Sex Voluntary GL +io% -3% -36%
Presumptive GL -54% -82% -84%
Note: Results are labeled "Insignificant" if both the underlying disparity and the effect of adoption are numerically and statistically
small.
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II. Qualifications and Concerns with the Results
The model above, like all econometric models, is not per-
fect. Some of the key limitations-such as the need to
control for endogeneity and the lack of data on prior crimi-
nal history-I have already discussed. But at least two
other important qualifications deserve mention.
A. Endogeneity Redux: Selecting the Type
of Guideline
I used time trends above to help control for endogeneity in
the timing of guideline adoption. But these trends cannot
control for why a state would choose voluntary over pre-
sumptive guidelines, and this type of endogeneity may be
important as well. After all, one reason why Virginia's leg-
islature may have felt comfortable implementing
voluntary guidelines is that it appoints and retains state
trial judges, giving it more power than most to encourage
compliance.
There is some (weak) evidence of endogeneity in the
choice of guidelines. While judges in Virginia are appointed
by the legislature, judges in Missouri (the other state adopt-
ing voluntary guidelines in my sample) are either elected in
partisan elections or appointed by merit commissions. And
results from regressions separating Virginia from Missouri
suggest that voluntary guidelines generally have stronger
effects in Virginia. Of course, that Virginia appears to
respond more favorably to voluntary guidelines than Mis-
souri need not imply that its method of judicial selection is
the critical differentiating factor: Virginia and Missouri dif-
fer in more ways than just judicial selection policies. But the
divergent outcomes do indicate that this is an important fac-
tor to consider in future research.
B. Guidelines and Prosecutorial Charging Decisions
A second limitation to the data used here is that they pro-
vide information only on the offense for which the
defendant is ultimately convicted, not on the offense for
which he is arrested or with which he is initially charged.
The data thus cannot measure the extent to which prose-
cutors change their charging behavior in response to
guidelines. Guidelines, for example, may induce judges to
pay less attention to race within a class of crimes while
simultaneously encouraging prosecutors to pay more
attention to race when determining who gets charged with
what specific offense. If this is true, then my results may
overestimate the benefits of guidelines.
It is possible, however, to overstate this problem. First,
Terrance Miethe studied charging behavior in Minnesota
before and after it adopted guidelines and found little evi-
dence of changing prosecutorial behavior of this sort. He
points out that several formal and informal constraints
prevent prosecutors from exercising their discretion too
freely. Differing evidentiary requirements for various
offenses and "courthouse subcultures," for example, can
make it hard to substitute across crimes.23
Second, the coarseness of the NCRP data used here
helps. The offenses listed in the NCRP are very broad:
aggravated assault and kidnapping, not third-degree aggra-
vated assault and second-degree kidnapping. And it is
harder for prosecutors to shift across crimes than within
the levels of a specific offense. Furthermore, at least for
violent and property crimes, the data used here show little
change in the distribution of offenses before and after
states adopt guidelines; as discussed above, the changes
are much more dramatic for drugs. Nonetheless, the sig-
nificance of prosecutorial discretion in this context is also
an important issue to consider further.
Ill. Future Issues to Consider
Following Blakely and Booker, state and federal legislators
face the challenging task of reforming their sentencing
regimes. The results here provide only the first steps
toward a rigorous empirical understanding of how the
various still-viable sentencing options operate in practice.
As a result, many open questions that merit attention
remain.
For example, voluntary guidelines are not the only
option that states have available to them; saying that vol-
untary guidelines can be effective is not the same as
saying they are the most effective alternative. As discussed
extensively elsewhere,24 states have at least two feasible
reforms other than voluntary guidelines: using sentencing
juries or using uncapped guidelines such as those already
used in Michigan and Pennsylvania.25 They also could
return to an indeterminate system of sentencing. Nancy
King and other commentators have started to empirically
evaluate sentencing juries. There is perhaps less work on
the efficacy of uncapped guidelines, but that arises in part
because such effects are currently hard to measure: Michi-
gan has had its system only since 2ooo, and
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has undermined judicial
enforcement of its guidelines2 6 Whether voluntary guide-
lines are the best alternative, then, depends on future
results concerning the other options.
Moreover, that voluntary guidelines appear to influ-
ence judicial behavior does not tell us why they do so. And
the results above are consistent with at least three differ-
ent theories, each with different policy implications. Do
judges follow guidelines because they want to sentence
consistently but fail to do so, either due to forgetfulness or
unconscious bias? Then guidelines work simply by provid-
ing signposts, and it is not surprising that presumptive
and voluntary guidelines may have similar effects. Or do
judges follow guidelines only because the legislature can
make credible threats to impose more-binding guidelines
on them? In the wake of Blakely and Booker these threats
may be weaker, but they remain: legislatures, for example,
can expand mandatory minimums or impose sentencing
juries on judges. Or do judges adhere to voluntary guide-
lines because their jobs or promotions depend on it, as
may be the case in Virginia? In this case, effective volun-
tary guidelines may require substantial judicial reform.
Determining why voluntary guidelines appear to work is
thus a critical open issue.
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IV. Some Federal Implications
In the coming term, the Supreme Court will hear two
cases, Rita v. United States and Claiborne v. United States,
which will determine precisely how voluntary the federal
guidelines in fact are. In Rita, the Court faces the question
of whether sentences within the guideline ranges are pre-
sumptively reasonable; in Claiborne, the mirroring issue of
whether those outside the ranges are presumptively
unreasonable. The results here shed light on some of the
implications of the pair of cases.
In short, if the Court finds the guidelines wholly
voluntary-if it holds that within-range sentences are not
presumptively reasonable nor outside-range sentences
presumptively unreasonable-then variation in sentence
length should increase, and race and sex will possibly play
more important roles in sentencing. But at the same time,
declaring the guidelines wholly voluntary will not render
them wholly irrelevant. Sentencing should still be more
consistent and less mindful of race and sex than in the
absence of any guidelines.
It is important to note, though, that my findings are
based on state data, and extrapolating state results to the
federal system should be undertaken only with some wari-
ness. Federal judges face markedly different incentives,
since they are not as responsive to political pressures as
state judges. Moreover, the federal guidelines may be
uniquely more punitive than the judges who apply them:
federal judges may be more inclined than their state coun-
terparts to deviate from nonbinding guidelines. It is thus
difficult to predict exactly how effective wholly voluntary
federal guidelines would be, but it is likely that they would
continue to exert (some) meaningful influence.
As states and the federal government continue to
reform their sentencing regimes in the wake of Blakely
and Booker, one option they possess is to unbind their
guidelines. This is certainly not the only possibility
available-sentencing juries and uncapped guidelines
being the most obvious alternatives-but my results sug-
gest that it is one at least worthy of consideration.
Notes
I would like to thank Dan Richman for his helpful comments
on this Article.
The thirteen states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
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from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison and Jail Inmates
at Midyear 2003, NCJ 203947 (2004), in 2002 these thirteen
states held over 28 percent of all prisoners and were respon-
sible for over 38 percent of all new admissions; with the
federal prison system included, these numbers rise to 40
percent and 44 percent, respectively.
2 So far eight states have held their guidelines unconstitu-
tional: Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Oregon. Furthermore, Alaska's leg-
islature amended its guidelines to ensure compliance with
Blakely. The supreme courts in three other states (California,
New Mexico, and Tennessee) have sought to distinguish their
presumptive guideline systems from those discussed in
Blakely and Booker, but the Supreme Court recently held Cali-
fornia's sentencing law unconstitutional. See Cunningham v.
California, No. 05-6551 (2007).
3 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 27-28 (1996).
1 Alberto Gonzales, Speech before the American Bar Ass'n
House of Delegates in Chicago, Illinois, on August 8, 2005
(available online at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2005/080805agamericanbarassoc.htm).
5 This impression was strengthened by a claim made recently
in this journal. Kim S. Hunt and Michael Connelly, Advisory
Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT. RER 233, 236
(2005), noted that "[n]o controlled experiments or rigorous
quasi experiments have been done isolating the effects of
presumptive guidelines from other variables that may have
affected systematic outcomes."
6 The results discussed in this paper come from John F Pfaff, The
Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing after Blakely: The Effec-
tiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235 (2006).
7 I do not consider any technical econometric issues here.
Those interested in a detailed discussion of methodological
issues should see Id.
8 The punitive nature of the federal guidelines is well docu-
mented. Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of
U.S. Sentencing Practices, in MICHAEL TONRY AND RICHARD S.
FRASE, EDS., SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
(2001), provides a brief description of Pennsylvania's guide-
lines, noting that the legislature rejected an earlier version for
being too lenient. That Michigan has similar guidelines to
Pennsylvania's, which set floors but no ceilings, at least
weakly suggests that its legislature was motivated by similar
intents. And my empirical results provide some evidence that
average sentences imposed in Michigan rose immediately
after the state adopted its new guidelines in 1999. See Pfaff,
Continued Vitality, supra note 6 at 293.
9 Ilyana Kuziemko & Steven Levitt, An Empirical Analysis of
Imprisoning Drug Offenders, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2043 (2004),
provides a good description of the NCRR
10 Virginia first imposed state-level voluntary guidelines in
1991, but it overhauled the guidelines when it adopted its
truth-in-sentencing law in 1995. In particular, it severely nar-
rowed the ranges of sentences judges were supposed to
consider. Ultimately, 1995 appears to be the better year to
use. This is not a minor issue: if 1991 is used as the year of
adoption instead of 1995, the results for voluntary guidelines
are significantly weaker. Pfaff, Continued Vitality, supra note 6.
11 Technically, Michigan used judicially created presumptive
guidelines since 1984. A Michigan judge noted, however, that
these guidelines covered such a small fraction of the possible
crimes with which a defendant could be charged that they
had little or no effect. See Paul L. Maloney, The Michigan Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 16 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 13, 16 (1999). In
1999, the Michigan legislature replaced the porous judicial
guidelines with a comprehensive presumptive system. In the
end, little turns on whether Michigan's guidelines are classi-
fied as presumptive starting in 1984 or 1999.
12 Tennessee adopted its guidelines in 1989; as discussed
below, this means I do not classify it as adopting its guide-
lines until one year later, in 1990. However, with only one
pre-adoption year, it makes sense for technical reasons not to
include it as one of the "adopting in the period" states, such
as Michigan or Ohio.
13 Illinois officially employs a determinate sentencing regime.
However, the law establishes wide ranges of sentences, and
aggravating and mitigating factors are not used by judges to
change the range of available sentences, but rather appear
only to help them figure out where in the set range they
should sentence. It is widely accepted that Illinois' system
survives Blakely, and as a result it makes sense to classify
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Illinois as a non-guideline state despite its nominal posses-
sion of such a system.
14 Technically, I lagged adoption by one year: Ohio, for example,
adopted its guidelines in 1996, so I did not classify it as a
presumptive guideline state until 1997. Many defendants
sentenced in 1996 committed their relevant crimes in 1995
and thus did not face the guidelines; by 1997 few such defen-
dants should be present. Also, for those readers familiar with
panel data, I included state, year, and "offense" fixed effects
(in case judges treated particular offenses in systematically
different ways).
i5 Many states changed their drug prosecution practices at the
same time they adopted their guidelines, making cross-year
comparisons difficult.
16 I regressed sentence length on the defendant's race and an
interaction term multiplying the race indicator with the volun-
tary or presumptive guideline indicator. I did the same for sex.
17 "Correction 1" incorporates a "linear correction" in the varia-
tion regression, interacting the state fixed effects with a
linear year term. "Correction 2" includes this linear interac-
tion term as well as one that interacts the state fixed effects
with the square of the year term. I used analogous, but
slightly more complex, terms in the impermissible factors
regressions.
18 The results in this table come regressions that consider all
fourteen states. In Pfaff, Continued Vitality, supra note 6 at
263-4, Tbl. 3, I also provide results from regressions that
include just the four "adopting" states. Both the absolute and
relative effects of voluntary guidelines are weaker in those
more-limited regressions.
19 For example, when looking at violent crimes, voluntary guide-
lines' absolute effectiveness falls by nearly 36 percent, from
-10.282 to -6.622, but their relative effectiveness rises from
77 percent as effective (-10.282 to -13.271) to almost twice
as effective (198 percent: -6.622 to -3.341).
20 Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States,
in MICHAEL TONRY, ED., ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND INTEGRATION 311,
346-47 (1997), point out that black defendants on average
have longer criminal histories than their white counterparts.
21 As I discuss in Pfaff, Continued Vitality, supra note 6 at 273,
there appear to be no state-level data sets on criminal histo-
ries that would provide even a rough proxy.
22 In other words, the change from a correctly estimated 10-
month disparity to a correctly estimated 6-month disparity is
the same as a change from a biased estimate of a 15-month
disparity to a biased estimate of an 11-month disparity, as
long as the bias pre- and post-adoption is the same.
23 Terrance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices
under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic
Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155,
157 (1987).
24 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16
FED. SENT. REP. 333 (2004); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Beyond Blakely, 16 FEO. SENT. RER 316 (2004).
25 As I discuss in more depth in Pfaff, Continued Vitality, supra
note 6 at 290-94, Michigan (if only because its guidelines
are so new) contributes little to the relatively strong per-
formance of presumptive guidelines seen in Tables 1 and 2.
The results in those tables, then, do not necessarily indicate
(nor disprove) that Michigan-style guidelines are more effec-
tive than voluntary guidelines at reducing variation or the
use of race and sex.
26 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentencing
Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91
Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1471 (1997).
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